August 30, 2019 posted by

Frank Jackson () formulates the intuition underlying his Jackson, F., , “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly The knowledge argument is a philosophical thought experiment proposed by Frank Jackson in his article “Epiphenomenal Qualia” () and extended in ” What. Jackson opens his essay with a definition: “It is undeniable that the physical, chemical and biological sciences have provided a great deal of information about .

Author: Dirr Goltigami
Country: Chile
Language: English (Spanish)
Genre: Science
Published (Last): 18 July 2008
Pages: 432
PDF File Size: 12.51 Mb
ePub File Size: 10.2 Mb
ISBN: 996-2-64751-604-9
Downloads: 25808
Price: Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]
Uploader: Zuluzil

Lycan’s account of Mary’s epistemic progress can be put, roughly, like this: Jackson suggests that Mary is simply discovering a new way for her brain to represent qualities that exist in the world.

For him the sensation of qualia and the rejection of Physicalism is an intuition.

Knowledge argument

To avoid the antimaterialist conclusion C3 the physicalist can a object against the inference from P1 to C1 a minority of philosophers have chosen this strategy, see Section 4. In other words, Jackson’s Mary is a scientist who knows everything there is to know about the science of color, but has never experienced color.

Feigl briefly discusses the epistemic qualiia of a Martian who studies human behavior but does not share human sentiments:.

Two different versions of the No Propositional Knowledge -View have been proposed. Fred consistently sorts the tomatoes the same way a.

In both cases cited by Jackson, an epistemic subject A appears to have no access to particular items of knowledge about a subject B: David Bourget – – Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 2: Open access to the SEP is made possible by a world-wide funding initiative.

In many of these cases, the idea is not used to argue directly against physicalism, although such a use is arguably present in Broad LewisLewis’s main argument for the Ability Hypothesis can be summarized like this.


As these examples suggest, the idea that complete physical knowledge isn’t sufficient for complete knowledge of phenomenal states has been around for a while.

This reasoning motivates his disjunctive account of knowing what it is like: The opponent would have to show that complete physical knowledge necessarily involves the capacity to imagine blue.

In order to show precisely that imaginative abilities are not sufficient for knowing what it is like, Conee introduces the following example: For the sake of argument, we assume compete physical 1 or 2 predictability and explainability of the behavior of humans equipped with vision, a sense of humor, and sentiments of piety. She argues that the property dualist can explain why the most direct way to get familiar with a quale is by having an experience of the relevant kind while the physicalist does not have any explanation for this particular feature of qualia.

The Martian could then predict all responses, including the linguistic utterances of the earthlings in the situations which involve their visual perceptions, their laughter about jokes, or their solemn behavior at the commemoration.

However, Jackson objects that Churchland’s formulation is not his intended argument.

The Modal argument works like this: If we say that the hurtfulness of pain Quale is partly responsible for causing pain avoiding behaviour then it seems just obvious. Even if we knew that fact, we still wouldn’t know what it is like to be Fred, although we’d know more about him eepiphenomenal.

In the context of his explanation of the difference between mechanistic and emergentist theories, C.

Qualia: The Knowledge Argument (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Several positive arguments for the view that Mary’s new knowledge after release constitutes propositional knowledge genuine information have been formulated in the literature. We believe we’ve learned the answer from a colorblind synesthete subject.


Moreover, that knowledge would include the ability to functionally differentiate between red and other colors. She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like “red”, “blue”, and so on.

The utmost that he could predict on this subject would be that certain changes would take place in the mucous membrane, the olfactory nerves and so on. Trout,Contemporary MaterialismLondon: Another doubt about the thought experiment is raised by the claim that a person who is confined to a monochromatic environment but knows everything physical there is to know about visual color experience would be able to figure out what colored things look like and thus would e. V3 Explicit formulation of the knowledge argument stronger version: Chalmers considers responses along the lines of the “ability hypothesis” objection described above to be the most promising objections, but unsuccessful: In Ludlow et al.

But, in any case, it is not clear that these claims undermine the knowledge argument. Broad makes the following remarks, describing a thought experiment where an archangel has unlimited mathematical competences:. Mirror Sites View this site from another server: Other possible reactions to the threat of epiphenomenalism for dualism would be either to doubt that a property dualist must embrace epiphenomenalism or to develop an account of knowledge about one’s own phenomenal states that does not imply a causal relation between qualia and phenomenal knowledge about qualia see Chalmers